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How to Reduce Market
Penetration Cycle Times
Thomas S. Robertson

E

VERYONE IS SPEEDING PRODUCTS TO MARKET THESE DAYS .

BUT

REDUCING PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT TIME IS ONLY HALF OF THE

equation; the other half is penetrating the market quickly. The author
draws on published research and industry practice to develop five recommendations for reducing market penetration time. He also develops a
tracking and diagnostic tool to help managers determine where their market penetration strategy is weak.

A

cademics, executives, and consultants are virtually unanimous on the importance of speed as a
competitive advantage and the need to achieve
more rapid strategic decision making:
Strategy making has changed. . . . The premium now
is on moving fast and keeping pace. . . . The best strategies are irrelevant if they take too long to formulate.1
— Kathleen M. Eisenhardt
Stanford University
Speed kills the competition.2
— Richard D. Stewart
Chief Executive Officer
Computer Corporation of America
As a strategic weapon, time is the equivalent of
money, productivity, quality, even innovation.3
— George Stalk, Jr.
Boston Consulting Group
Perhaps the most prevalent focus on speed has been
in new product development. Japanese companies have
been heralded as models of how to achieve time-based
advantages in reaching the market. Honda, Sony,
Canon, and Toshiba, among others, have been cited for
their abilities to reduce product development cycle times
and to introduce a constant stream of new products or
SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW/FALL 1993
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product improvements responsive to evolving customer
needs. Recently, many leading U.S. and European firms
also have adopted a time-based philosophy and are substantially reducing product development cycles.
Benetton is a well-known example. Management has
recognized the extreme difficulties of forecasting demand for style and fashion and has built the firm’s competitive advantage on a production and logistics system
that is enormously responsive to initial seasonal sales
data. Hewlett-Packard is also cited as a leading example
of reduced time to market. The advantages, according to
former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) John Young, are
not only faster market access but also higher quality and
lower costs: “Doing it fast forces you to do it right the
first time.”4 Other firms capturing competitors’ attention for reducing development times include Motorola,
General Electric, and Boeing. These firms have substantially reduced their time-to-market objectives — sometimes slashing them in half.

Product Development vs. Market
Penetration Cycle Times
Executives interested in reducing their firms’ product
development cycle times have a rich set of guidelines
and experiences from which to draw. Some excellent
books and review articles are available, and a reasonably
coherent set of recommendations can be made.5
ROBERTSON
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Much less attention has been given
Figure 1 Product Development–Market Penetration Time Line
to market penetration cycle time, that
is, the amount of time it takes to
Product
reach maximum sales potential for a
Development
new product. A major source of comMarket
petitive advantage thus remains: to
Penetration
achieve reductions in the time-tomarket acceptance. Objectives similar
to those formulated for product deTime
velopment might be developed in this
The process of product development and market penetration may overlap if the
area, for example, to reduce the marmarketing effort begins before actual market introduction.
ket penetration cycle time by half.
Figure 1 shows the time line of product development and market penetration.
The concept of a market window also suggests the
need for rapid market penetration. Abell has argued that
The Logic of Rapid Market Penetration
there are often limited periods when the fit between the
In an earlier era, it was possible to build market penetramarket’s needs and the firm’s competencies are optimal.7
tion gradually. Companies could roll out products by
In product categories subject to rapid competitive
region, and competitive imitation took time. Packaged
change, the market window may be open briefly before
goods firms, such as Procter & Gamble (P&G), Kraft,
it is too late to enter, due to competitive preemption.
and Lever, typically test-marketed and then engaged in
For example, Federal Express pioneered in the U.S.
product launches to a sequence of regional U.S. marmarket with reliable expedited shipments, but it missed
kets. National distribution was reached within about
the market window in Europe by using a rather diseighteen months. Entry to other markets — usually
jointed market-by-market strategy. In March 1992, it
Europe — came much later.
was forced to shut down its intra-European system.
Pricing was typically an issue of either skimming or
DHL and others, who had entered Europe early, had
penetration pricing. Skimming involves initially setting
built an insurmountable lead that Federal Express could
the price high to “skim” profits and then decreasing prices
not overcome.
gradually to reach broader markets. Polaroid is the classic
The net effect is that in the marketplace of the
example. Penetration pricing means setting low prices to
1990s, new products must be introduced almost simulsell at high volume and quickly increase market share.
taneously worldwide. If an idea is put “on display” or in
Texas Instruments in calculators is the usual example.
test markets, it is likely to be co-opted by another firm
In today’s competitive environment, however, the
and to appear in world markets before the innovator’s
firm rarely has the choice of gradual market penetration,
product. Indeed, many firms now find that the value of
regional rollouts, or price skimming. One exception
test markets is overshadowed by the risks of revealing
may be under conditions of high patent protection, as
one’s hand to competitors. Consequently, we’re seeing
in pharmaceuticals (witness Wellcome’s controversial
more controlled testing with lead users or simulated test
pricing strategy for its AIDS drug, AZT). However,
markets in laboratory settings.
even in pharmaceuticals, shorter product life cycles chalThe disadvantages of test markets and regional rolllenge the firm to achieve market penetration quickly.
outs are well documented in P&G’s entry to the cookie
The objective is to achieve steep acceleration of the sales
market with its Duncan Hines soft cookies. This prodcurve before further technological change dilutes the
uct was test-marketed in Kansas City with enormous
product’s potential.
success. However, competitors could read the results as
Rapid sales acceleration is especially needed in techquickly as P&G could and before it could build adequate
nology-based products, such as computers, where life
production capacity and achieve national distribution,
cycles for products such as workstations have been
Nabisco and Keebler preempted and reached national
shortening; sometimes it may be a matter of months bemarkets before the Duncan Hines product. Their advanfore new competitive products appear. A similar pattern
tage was the ready availability of production capacity.
of shortening product life cycles for products as disAlthough this then led to a patent infringement suit
parate as cosmetics, food, and pharmaceuticals has been
that was settled to P&G’s advantage, the Duncan Hines
6
documented.
product lost its momentum by entering markets behind
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Nabisco and Keebler and never achieved the promise that
the Kansas City test market suggested.

Guidelines for Reducing Market
Penetration Cycle Time
How can firms reduce market penetration cycle times?
Drawing from research in innovation theory and diffusion theory as well as management practice, I suggest
the following guidelines, subject to some qualifications.
1. Reach the market first.
2. Preannounce the new product before market availability.
3. Innovate constantly.
4. Occupy the market — multiple brands, positionings,
segments, and alliances.
5. Track market penetration by stage of the purchase decision process.

Reach the Market First

trial, and brand loyalty before other firms enter. If the
new product successfully fulfills customer needs, trial
levels decline substantially for later entrants. Similarly,
the pioneer has the ability to choose the most profitable
market segments and to select the optimal product positioning. The market pioneer may also take advantage of
the insights provided by lead users, who are positioned
at the front of market trends.10 Market pioneers may
also gain access to the most efficient distribution channels, achieve greater experience and scale advantages to
reduce costs, and be able to assume price leadership.
And market pioneers may have the best opportunity to
set standards in industries such as communications,
where standards are important.
Nevertheless, the market pioneer also faces some potential disadvantages. The most important, of course, is
that most new products fail. Interestingly, this is often
not taken into account in extolling the virtues of market
pioneering. Additionally, the firm that engages in product development ahead of later entrants encounters
higher R&D costs and runs the risk of entering the
market with a suboptimal product or a premature technology. A common scenario is the early market entrant
that achieves rapid market penetration but cannot hold
it as superior new products enter. For example, General
Electric quickly moved to a second generation CT scanner and took the market away from EMI, a small U.K.
firm. Finally, although product life cycles have shortened, the takeoff point for some technologies is still
slow. The takeoff of fax technology, for example, came
many years after product availability. Some technologies, such as multimedia — combining computers and

There are potential advantages and disadvantages of
being first to market, but the evidence is in favor of
being a market pioneer (see Table 1). Many pioneer
firms gain lasting market share advantage and may remain the top brand in their product category over
decades, especially in consumer goods.
Recent research gives some sense of the potential advantage of being first to market. Urban et al., using simulated test market data for frequently purchased consumer
goods, found that the second firm to enter a market
could expect to do only 71 percent as
well in market share as the pioneer and
Table 1 Market Pioneer Advantages and Disadvantages
that the third firm to enter could exPotential Advantages
Potential Disadvantages
pect to do only 58 percent as well.8
Higher levels of awareness
Most new products fail
The value of market pioneering in industrial products has also been docuSuperior reputation
Higher R&D costs
mented. Market pioneers tend to
Higher rates of customer trial
Risk of premature technology
achieve substantially higher market
Greater likelihood of brand loyalty
Risk of suboptimal product features
shares: the early follower can expect to
Selection of most profitable segments
Higher costs of market development
do only 76 percent as well as the marSelection of optimal positioning
May create a market for competitors
ket pioneer and the late entrant only
9
Insights
from
lead
users
Timing
may be premature for product takeoff
51 percent as well as the pioneer.
The sources of these advantages are
Choice of most efficient distribution
channels
the barriers to entry erected against
Lower costs due to greater experience
later entrants — assuming the pioand scale
neering product successfully fulfills
Price leadership
customer needs. Consumer advantage
emanates from the ability of the pioOpportunity to set standards
neer to achieve awareness, reputation,
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videodisks in an interactive mode — have
Table 2 Product Preannouncement
been heralded by many analysts but have not
yet reached takeoff. The danger is that the
Can Market Advantage Be Gained by Preannouncing New Products?
first firm to market may not receive a return
Yes, if:
on investment for many years in technologies
Market Factors
• Low market share
that are slow to take off.
• Low competitive reactivity
The bottom line, however, is that the ad• Strong patent protection
• Need to establish standards
vantages seem to outweigh the disadvantages.
• Image-reputation value
Nevertheless, each new product introduction
Customer Behavior Factors • High new-product learning requirements
is unique, and companies must weigh the
• High switching costs
pros and cons of first entry and delayed entry.
• Lengthy customer decision process
Large firms often have been assumed to have
Value Chain Factors
• Need for complementary products
the capability to overcome not being first to
• Need to develop supply or distribution systems
market, but this philosophy seems to be
changing. General Electric’s CEO Jack Welch
posite production capability and plant capacity.” 12
now advocates first-to-market advantage, and even market leaders such as AT&T have found it difficult to
Similarly, Glaxo announced in advance of market introcatch up in communication hardware when they have
duction that it had made “massive investments in buildlost first-to-market initiative in new product categories.
ings, equipment, and human resources” for its new
biotech “drug colony stimulating factor.”13 In both
cases, these preannouncements could be interpreted as
Preannounce before Market Availability
directed at competitors, to discourage competitive entry.
They were also strong signals of market commitment to
Can a faster takeoff be gained by announcing the new
potential customers.
product to customers before market introduction? High
Table 2 outlines the logic of whether new products
technology products are frequently (and confidentially)
should be preannounced, focusing on customer, as oppreannounced to key accounts, but what about broad
posed to competitor, issues. Three categories are gerannouncements, such as IBM’s preannouncement of its
mane: market factors, customer behavior factors, and
PS/2 personal computer some months before general
value chain factors.
product availability?
In a recent survey of marketing managers across a
Market Factors
range of U.S. industries, 51 percent reported that their
Preannouncing is desirable if the firm has low market
firm preannounced its last new product or service.11 The
share, competes in an industry with low competitive retiming of these preannouncements ranged from one
activity, has strong patent protection, needs to establish
month in advance of product availability to twenty-four
market standards, and could gain image and reputation
months, with the median being between three and four
value by preannouncing. If the opposite of these condimonths. A rule of thumb is that if the product is to be
tions holds, the firm should not preannounce.
preannounced, the timing should be as far in advance as
• Market Share. A firm that has high market domithe length of the customer’s purchase decision process.
nance within the product category will not benefit from
For example, if customers take on average six months to
preannouncing new products. Preannouncements run
make a decision on a new machine tool, then the prodthe risk of cannibalizing sales from present products.
uct should be preannounced six months in advance.
Alternatively, if the firm has low market presence within
Otherwise, the firm’s first sale will be some time after
the product category, cannibalization risks are low, and
the product’s market introduction.
it is in the firm’s best interest to delay customer purchasAlthough I am focusing on preannouncements to
es until its new product enters the market. If the firm is
customers, in certain cases preannouncing might also
not participating in a product category, the objective of
have value for preempting competitors. Alcan Alupreannouncing is to freeze the market until its new
minum of Canada recently announced the successful
product appears.
production of a new aluminum composite material and
• Competitive Reactivity. In industries or product cateemphasized its production capability: “A scale of this
gories characterized by high levels of competitive reacmagnitude continues to place Alcan in a commanding
tion, preannouncing is not recommended. If competilead worldwide in the establishment of aluminum com-
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tive reaction is limited or unlikely, it is in the firm’s best
interest to act aggressively. The level of competitive reactivity is a function not only of the number of competitors but also of how vigorously and how directly they
compete with one another. Firms in niche positions are
in a better position to preannounce because there is less
threat from competitors, as are small firms that may
tend to be ignored by other competitors.
• Patent Protection. Patent protection builds a certain
immunity to retaliation. This is one reason behind the
high number of preannouncements in the pharmaceuticals industry.
• Standards. In many industries, especially those that
are technology based, the creation of a dominant standard is important. The development of such a standard
is highly dependent on achieving rapid consumer acceptance; preannouncing may be beneficial. In handwriting
recognition computers, for example, the battle is on to
determine which operating system will become the system of choice; competitors such as GO Corporation
and Microsoft have been scrambling to outdo each
other on product announcements before availability.
• Image/Reputation. Preannouncing is also recommended if it will improve the firm’s image and reputation. Fujitsu’s leap to preannounce its new mainframes
on the day before IBM’s system 390 preannouncement
would seem to be motivated by a desire to seize the initiative and create a leading-edge perception. It is difficult to build a reputation based on parity products, but
early preannouncements of innovative products may accrue significant benefits to the firm. A risk, however, is
if the product does not enter the market as scheduled.
Many software firms are accused of announcing “vaporware,” which never appears or which comes out with
significant features missing. Such problems build market skepticism toward the firm and its announcements.
Customer Behavior Factors
Certain patterns of customer behavior may favor preannouncements.
• Customer Learning. Preannouncing a new product
will be advantageous if the product requires substantial
customer learning. This will be the case for many technology-based products, as opposed to packaged goods.
It may be especially desirable to preannounce to more
sophisticated consumers and leading-edge accounts,
which may be more receptive to new product ideas and
more capable of learning. They will also have disproportionate influence on other customers in the market.
• Switching Costs. If customers must undertake substantial one-time costs to convert to the new product,
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then preannouncing is recommended. Switching costs
can be a major factor in retarding adoption of a new
product. Preannouncing may allow the customer to
plan far enough ahead to minimize switching costs or
spread them over multiple periods.
• Length of Decision Process. If the customer’s decision
process is long, then preannouncing may be necessary.
Telecommunication utilities, for example, make budgeting decisions for new switching equipment two years
or more before installation. If the product is not preannounced, the first sales may be months or years away.
Value Chain Factors
In many cases, the sale of new products depends on the
participation and commitment of other firms in the
value chain. Preannouncement may be necessary in
order to build this participation. Preannouncement is
advisable when the product needs complementary products or the firm needs to build supply or distribution
commitments.
• Complementary Products. Many new products require complementary products to be of value to the
consumer. For example, microwaves were of limited
value until food manufacturers adopted microwaveable
plastic trays, and videocassette recorders (VCRs) were of
limited value until movies became available on cassettes.
Generally, the more dependent the new product is on
complementary products, the more important preannouncing will be. Thus, a key motivation for IBM to
preannounce its PS/2 personal computer was to encourage software developers to begin writing programs for
its OS/2 operating system. Similarly, NCR and GRiD
Systems’ launches of their pen-based computers were
preceded by announcements in order to encourage development of application software.
• Supply and Distribution Systems. For certain products, the ability to penetrate the market depends on access to supply or distribution. If either is in question,
preannouncement might signal commitment to the
product and encourage such relationships. For example,
favorable distribution relationships are critical in industries where sales are dependent on distributor sales
support rather than end-consumer advertising. Preannouncements can help distributors avoid inventory
problems and may build a sense of partnership between
the firm and its distributors.

Innovate Constantly
Market penetration is rarely accomplished with a single,
discrete innovation; a constant stream of innovation is
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necessary. Thus, as a firm is reaching the market
Figure 2 Constant Innovation: Boeing's Current Portfolio of
with an innovation, it must already be planning
Enhancements and Migrations
improvements and replacements.
The need for unremitting innovation resides
The Boeing Product Line
first in the competitive environment. Inevitably,
600
successful new products engender imitation.
Building barriers to entry, especially patents, is
500
highly desirable, but the ultimate defense is a
strong offense: constantly raising the innovative
400
400
ante. In fact, if the firm prematurely pursues scale
efficiencies as a barrier to entry, it may simply
300
300
300
300
lock itself into a technology that becomes obsolete as the battle moves to second- or third-gener200
200
200
200
ation products.
Consumer demands also necessitate unremit100
100
100
100
100
ting innovation. A new product may be enthusiastically accepted, but consumers inevitably seek
improved benefits. Despite the acceptance of
767
777
747
757
737
Sony’s Walkman, consumers wanted it even
Migrations
smaller, lighter, in alternative designs, for sports,
and so forth. If Sony had rested on its laurels for
lished patterns of consumption or production, such as
even a few months, competitors could have seized the
development of a new generation of technology. For exinitiative (and to some extent did) by capitalizing on
ample, whereas first generation CT scanners could perthis escalation process.
form head scans, second generation CT scanners could
Benefit modification (or repositioning) may also be
perform whole body scans.
necessary for some innovations, especially to reach
Inventions create new patterns of consumption or
broader segments of the market. Manufacturers origiproduction — the first CT scanner, personal computer,
nally envisioned microwave ovens as a replacement for
or jet engine. Inventions can totally change an industry’s
the kitchen stove, a concept that did not sell. But when
competitive structure, although their occurrence is occamicrowaves were repositioned as a secondary method of
sional and difficult to predict.
cooking and their size was reduced to fit on the kitchen
Boeing has successfully managed the innovation concounter, they successfully penetrated the market.
tinuum, as shown in Figure 2. The 737 jet, which was
Unfortunately for the pioneer firms, such as Litton, it
initially introduced in 1968, is now in its fifth enhancewas the later entrants, Japanese and Korean manufacturment, the 737-500, and a sixth was recently announced.
ers, that performed these redefinitions and benefited
Boeing’s enhancements take advantage of evolving techfrom them.
nologies (in engines, avionics, and metal composites) to
keep the product up-to-date and extend its capabilities,
Managing the Innovation Continuum
thus potentially expanding its opportunities into new
How does a firm constantly innovate? Innovation runs on
routes or segments and keeping competitors at bay by
a continuum from enhancements to migrations to invenrevealing no weakness.
tions. The challenge is to manage the total continuum.
Migration occurs as technology improves, allowing
Enhancements involve minor changes in established
the introduction of significantly more advanced aircraft.
patterns of consumption or production, usually within
Boeing has developed a stream of new generation airone generation of technology. Enhancements may finecraft, from the 707 to the 777, which is now in early
tune the product to customer needs or add value to
phases of production.
reach new market segments. In some industries, such as
Boeing is also aware of the possibility of inventions,
consumer packaged goods, most of the innovation that
which create entirely new functionality. Perhaps vertical
takes place is enhancement. But even in high-technolotake off and landing combined with supersonic transgy markets, enhancements can be a major source of
port speeds (VTOL-SST) will become viable. Boeing
profits.
cannot run the risk of being late to market with such an
Migrations involve more significant changes in estab-
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invention, much as the Douglas Aircraft Company was
late to market with a jet aircraft, the DC-8, after leading
the market for multiple decades during the propeller
era. The cost for Douglas was a loss of leadership and
acquisition by McDonnell to become McDonnell
Douglas.
To manage the total innovation continuum, firms
must exploit the range of opportunities, from those that
may have only minor effects on consumption patterns
to those that create whole new consumption patterns.
Undue focus on either end of the continuum may cause
problems. For example, the firm may focus only on enhancements and miss the change to new technologies. It
may focus only on invention and go out of business before the product becomes a commercial reality.

Occupy the Market
Market penetration requires the blanketing of the market with multiple products, positionings, and sometimes even multiple brands to occupy the spectrum of
segmentation opportunities. Hamel and Prahalad give
the example of Toshiba in laptop computers:
Toshiba’s blistering pace of product introduction allowed it to explore almost every possible market niche
and to outrun rivals. . . . If one particular model
failed, its withdrawal would hardly cause a ripple. . . .
By 1991 Toshiba had discontinued more laptop
models than some of its flat-footed competitors had
launched.14
The objective is to occupy the market and leave little
room for competitive entry. One study gives evidence of
the danger of neglecting market positionings. Cook and
Rothberg found a Spearman rank correlation of .81 between share of the car market and share of models.15
They argue that as U.S. automakers have reduced the
number of models in their lines in order to pursue standardization and cost efficiency, they have failed to meet
a full range of customer needs and thus have lost market
share. Neglected market positionings may invite competition and limit the firm’s ability to substantially penetrate the market.
A company may also need to launch multiple brands
in order to penetrate the market. IBM has finally succumbed to market pressure and introduced Ambra — a
clone of its own personal computer that does not carry
the IBM name — to its European operation.16 The
IBM brand name simply cannot cover the entire market, including the low end. Procter & Gamble is a mas-

SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW/FALL 1993

ter at using multiple brands to achieve high levels of
market penetration, whether in detergents, soaps, or
even diapers. The basic premise is that market needs are
diverse and that multiple brands are necessary to occupy
the set of product positionings that are available. It is
better to create your own competition than to allow
other manufacturers to compete with you.
Of course, there are disadvantages to multipositioning or multibrand strategies. The most obvious is cost:
creating multiple brands is expensive. Possible confusion
is another potential disadvantage; customers may fail to
appreciate the subtleties among multiple brands. There
is also the risk of the firm losing focus and diluting its
core brands. Finally, many firms have achieved success
by dominating a segment or a niche and choosing not
to compete in the total market.
Building Alliances
Successful market penetration also depends on the ability to develop global alliances. A single firm usually lacks
the resources, talent, and time to penetrate global markets before a product loses its innovative advantage.
Some of the world’s largest firms are pursuing alliances
to achieve faster and broader levels of penetration.
Alliances can afford broader market access. General
Mills has formed a joint venture with Nestlé to gain better access to the European market for its cereal brands
(see Figure 3). The alliance combines Nestlé and General
Mills cereals in one portfolio supplemented by additional cereal brands acquired from Ranks Hovis McDougall
of the United Kingdom. In biotech drugs, Genetics
Institute has formed alliances with European and Japanese partners to gain access to their markets. In computers, most of the major manufacturers are forming alliances with value-added resellers and other indirect
channels in order to reach a broader range of accounts,
particularly smaller accounts.
Alliances can also deepen market access. For example, both Roche and Glaxo sold Glaxo’s anti-ulcer drug
Zantac in the U.S. market. Glaxo did not have a large
enough detail force to cover the market and capitalize
on the opportunity by itself. Similarly, both ICI Pharmaceuticals and Thomas Morson, a Merck subsidiary,
sell the same A.C.E. inhibitor, but under different
names (Zestril and Carace, respectively) in order to gain a
higher level of salesforce coverage with physicians.
Alliances can also be valuable for developing a dominant standard. Firms may even create their own competition in order to achieve a dominant standard. In workstations, for example, many analysts believe that only
two or three standards can survive. Thus Sun is encour-
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sion process. The company must be
capable of tracking each customer (or
segment of customers) and monitoring progress toward purchase.
Nestlé
General Mills
The idea that customers must prog• World's largest food company
• Strong range of cereal brands
ress through a sequence of stages be• International brand equity
• Cereal marketing expertise
fore purchase is hardly new. The basic
• Strong distribution system
• But little international presence
process is as follows: When a new
• But few cereal brands
product is introduced, the firm must
Cereals include:
Cereals include:
(1) build awareness among potential
• Cheerios/Honey Nut Cheerios
• Chocapic
• Golden Grahams
customers, (2) move these potential
• Sportis
• Wheaties
customers to a favorable attitude to• Trix
ward the product, (3) encourage trial,
and (4) achieve purchase (repeat purchase, in most cases).17 Of course, someJoint venture (1989) creates:
times phases are skipped or others
Cereal Partners (CP)
added. For example, marketers may
provide free samples, especially in con• Each partner contributes $80 million
• CP to market cereal brands outside of the United States
sumer goods, to short-circuit the deciand Canada under the Nestlé trademark
sion process. For tracking and diagnostic purposes, however, these four
phases provide the necessary information.
Acquisition (1990) of:
It is critically important to track poRanks Hovis McDougall (UK) Cereal Brands
• CP pays acquisition price of $167 million
tential customers over time. The firm
needs to know, at any given moment,
Acquired cereal brands include:
what percentage of the market has
• Shreddies
reached each stage. Only then will it
• Shredded Wheat
be able to decide what to do in order
to further penetration. Consider the
aging competitors to use its SPARC chip, and IBM is
introduction of a new product to the market on 1
entering into alliances with Apple and Digital EquipJanuary 1993. The graphs in Figure 4 illustrate four posment Corporation to use its RS-6000 chip. A high-tech
sible scenarios that might occur by 31 December 1993.
firm that is not aligned with one of the dominant stanThey are based on quarterly tracking surveys.
dards is unlikely to be able to participate in the market
at all, as software is not going to be written for minor
Low Awareness
players, and customers are seeking compatibility and
In this scenario, sales are being held back because of the
low switching costs. In the battle for VCR standards,
inability to develop awareness, which is at the 35 perMatsushita broadly licensed its VHS format as part of
cent level among potential customers. Low awareness is
its strategy to achieve dominance over Sony’s Beta forusually a communication problem, and the remedy genmat. The new battle in compact discs pits Sony’s minierally is to increase advertising or direct mail spending
disc against Philip’s digital disc. Each company is seekand salesforce coverage.
ing alliances to gain the edge.
Low Favorable Attitude
This scenario is somewhat more troublesome than low
Track Market Penetration by Customer
awareness because it might suggest a lack of acceptance
Decision Stage
for the product or service concept. Although awareness
is now at over 95 percent, favorable attitude has reached
Not only must a company establish rapid penetration, it
only the 25 percent level. Low levels of favorable attimust also develop a tracking and diagnostic system to
tude often indicate that customers have not been given
measure its success. The key to rapid sales acceleration is
sufficient positive information. The firm may need to
moving customers quickly through the purchase deciFigure 3 Alliances to Achieve a Pan-European Portfolio
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Figure 4 Typical Market Penetration Scenarios
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add more salespeople or trade demonstrations or change
the communication campaign to better demonstrate the
product benefits. However, if consumers are reasonably
informed and many are rejecting the product, the company may need to be content with a narrow segment,
drawing customers from the 25 percent of the market
with favorable attitudes. Contact lenses, for example,
tend to fit this profile; they have failed to convert a large
profile of the population, despite product improvements
such as soft and long-wearing lenses. Alternatively, the
product may need to be modified to reach a broader
market.
Low Trial Rate
In this scenario, awareness and attitude have developed

Mar 31 June 30

Sept 30

Dec 31

1993

Awareness

SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW/FALL 1993

Sept 30

Low Repeat Purchase Level
Percent Market Penetration

Percent Market Penetration

Low Trial Rate

Mar 31

June 30
1993

100%
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Jan 1

Mar 31

nicely, but the market is not converting to trial. Common causes of this problem are (1) poor distribution —
the product is not readily available, (2) pricing — the
price is too high, and (3) communications — the advertising campaign is too focused on reach (exposure to
many possible customers), when it should be focused on
frequency (the number of ad exposures per potential
customer). These areas should be reevaluated.
Low Purchase (or Low Repeat Purchase)
This is the worst problem. The new product is performing well on all stages except purchase or repeat purchase.
Either the product does not deliver on its promises or
the product’s benefits have been oversold. Product redesign or repositioning (even withdrawal) may then be
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necessary. Sometimes, however, a low repeat purchase rate
is due to pricing or distribution; price reductions and expanded or better directed distribution may be helpful.
In summary, achieving rapid sales acceleration means
moving customers through the purchase decision process expeditiously. This requires more than simply appropriating a certain level of marketing resources. It requires a tracking system that decomposes awareness,
attitude, trial, and purchase in order to develop informed diagnoses of what types and levels of marketing
resources will be required at different points in time.

Conclusion
Speed is a management imperative, especially in the domain of new products. However, being quick to market
is only half the battle. An equally important challenge is
to shorten the time to market penetration. A product’s
chances of long-run sales success are enhanced if it can
achieve rapid market access and penetration. However,
the battle for long-term supremacy depends on constant
and unremitting innovation. Successful new products
are an invitation to market entry for other competitors.
As product life cycles become shorter and the speed of
imitation increases, ongoing innovation is the only sustainable strategy for success.
We are all familiar with the typical S-shaped product
life cycle. We also recognize that it is not the optimal
sales curve. In general, firms want maximum sales acceleration; the objective is to penetrate the market and
seize the competitive initiative.
I have made five recommendations for reducing market penetration time:
• Reach the market first.
• Preannounce the new product.
• Innovate constantly.
• Occupy the market.
• Track market penetration by stage of the purchase decision process.
The era when firms had the luxury of slowly rolling
out products may be gone. Innovation advantage dissipates quickly, and imitation is rampant. A firm must
design global penetration strategies before market
launch. If it does not achieve simultaneous market access, the opportunity is soon lost. If it does not blanket
the market, competitors will find entry gaps. If it does
not engage in constant innovation, it soon becomes ob-

solete. Such is the competitive arena we face, and there
is no reason to believe that competition will ease or become less reactive. ◆
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